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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a proliferation of new procedures
involving "participation" or "deliberation" in many Western
democracies, both at the national level (in the form of institutionalised
public debates) and at the local level (fostered by decentralized
structures of the State). Following this path, private organizations are
now experiencing new ways of taking into account the sensitivity of
citizens when deciding the company's position on the development of
certain controversial products 1 or industrial plants. 2 Beyond the
merely fashionable aspect of this new "deliberative imperative,"
political actors and private companies seem to take these new
procedures more seriously than purely instrumental, as they pave the
way for new forms of governance in complex matters such as climate
change (within the Agenda 21 frame for example),3 or biotechnology.4
Several factors have contributed to this wave of procedural
innovation, which has taken root in all modern democracies. There is
the increasing awareness of technological and environmental hazards
and risks; there is the growth of mass protest and opposition to the
establishment which has succeeded in blocking certain major political
decisions; and more generally, there is the emergence of a new
deliberative paradigm which puts forward a new approach to political
legitimacy.5 The public is thus clamouring for a space of expression
1 The pharmaceutical industry regularly organizes Citizen Forums in order to enlighten
major decisions on the future orientation of medical research. For example, the Forum
organized by the GlaxoSmithKline Laboratory in June 20o6 examined the theme,
"Therapeutical progress, at what price?,"
http://www.glaxosmithkline.fr/gsk/mediasgp/2oo6/Charte.pdf. For an overall discussion
of the GSK forum, see
http://www.gsk.fr/avenirdelasante/lettre/documents/Lettre8DebatAvenirSante.pdf.
2 In France, citizen information and participation began in 1993 and further developed in
2003, following the explosion of AZF (a chemical plant) in September 2001. As a result,
local commissions involving citizen groups have emerged as mediators, monitoring the
evolution, extension, and emergency plans of factories.
3 Agenda 21 signifies local programs derived from the "Action 21" plan of action proposed
by the Rio World Summit in 1992. They are concerted processes in which local authorities
along with citizen and stakeholders define economic and social priorities within a broader
environmental and sustainable perspective.
4 Loic Blondiaux and Yves Sintomer, "L'imp~ratif d~lib6ratif," Politix, 57 (2002): 17-35.
5 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992); P. Chambat
and J. Fourniau, "D6bat public et participation d~mocratique," Le ddbatpublic: une
r~forme dans l'Etat (Paris: LGDJ, 2001), 9-37; Bernard Manin, "Volont6 G6n6rale ou
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and for a more direct control over fundamental choices made by
governments. In France for instance, progressive institutionalization
of the National Commission on Public Debate, from the Barnier law of
1995 to the "Neighbourhood Democracy Act of 2002," consecrates the
legitimacy of these demands for citizen involvement at the heart of the
decision-making process. Today, above and beyond the many
difficulties encountered when putting the deliberative paradigm into
practice in democratic societies, decision-making procedures now
have to be evaluated in the light of this paradigm which is firmly
ensconced as a normative horizon, and maybe also as a Utopian ideal.
In this framework, despite many "family disputes," the core of
current theories which confer an essential role to argumentative
exchange in the construction of value judgments stem from the
approach of Habermas, and are based on the concept of
"communicative action."6 Even though it has been sharply criticized
by many authors who emphasize its limits and its essentially
normative character, the Habermas approach to deliberation pervades
the majority of experiments. 7 This theory valorises the rational
discursive capacities of citizens and argues for the need to include
them more broadly in a process of "collective construction of world-
views" to coin the phrase of Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe.8 Thus,
virtually all current theories of deliberation consider that
argumentative exchange is the only reflexive process which can enable
the emergence of public opinion and social norms.9
D6ibration? Esquisse d'une Th6orie de la D6lib6ration Politique," Le Ddbat 33 (1985):
72-93; Bernard Manin, "D6libfration et Discussion," Swiss Political Science Review 15,
no. 3 (2005): 338-68; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The
Good Polity, ed. A. Hamlin and P. Pettit (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34.
6 Michael Neblo, "Family Disputes: Diversity in Defining and Measuring Deliberation,"
Swiss Political Science Review, 13(4) (2007): 527-57.
7 One could question the important role played here by social scientists who participated in
the design and/or the evaluation of these experiments. Our role here has most certainly
emphasized this trend and contributed to crystallizing a weak Habermasian vulgate among
practitioners of rational discussion and argumentative exchange.
8 Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes, and Yannick Barthe, Agir dans un monde incertain
(Paris: Seuil, 2001).
9 The core of the Habermasian theory of communicative action states that in modem
society, norms are emerging out of discussion and therefore are not imposed by tradition
or religious beliefs (at least not totally). Deliberation is nevertheless threatened by
systemic trends of the political and economical spheres which impose their own
instrumental functioning, out of normative grounds. "The notion of deliberative
democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the
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Although in Habermas's work deliberation encompasses two
dimensions, one which is procedural and limited to the political public
sphere and the other which is embedded in every day discussion, a
heavy academic trend has focused on the search for optimal
conditions for the organization of debate in order to create the
necessary conditions for a "good deliberation" in the political public
sphere.' 0 As Simone Chambers rightly states, contemporary research
on democratic deliberation has therefore somewhat neglected the
other aspect of Habermas's theory which analyses the relationship
between civil society and the state, and their various mediations."
This call for procedure rests on the idea that only strict constraints can
pave the way for a real deliberation where in real life it is perverted by
all sorts of social and communicational distortions. These constraints
include the transparency and the public nature of the process; the
equality of the different parties participating in the debate; the
sincerity of arguments invoked, their moral justification, the
manifestation of respect towards participants and reciprocity.12 All of
justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public reasoning
among equal citizens." Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," 21 (see n. 5).
10 "Deliberation is a demanding form of communication, though it grows out of
inconspicuous daily routines of asking for and giving reasons. In the course of everyday
practices, actors are always already exposed to a space of reasons. They cannot but
mutually raise validity claims for their utterances and claim that what they say should be
assumed... to be true or right or sincere, and at any rate rational." Jiirgen Habermas,
"Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic
Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research," Communication
Theory 16, no. 3 (2006): 414-26.
" Simone Chambers, "Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy
Abandoned Mass Democracy?" (forthcoming, 2oo8).
12 These are minimal requirements, which are more or less unanimously recognised in the
literature on the question. It is clear that these procedural requirements remain quite
insufficient to ensure the success of a deliberation. For example, Levine et al. identify
other procedural elements: the link between the deliberation and the final decision; an
open discussion with the search for some measure of agreement, if not perfect consensus,
on points of dispute; a mediation of the exchanges in order to ensure a fair balance
between the participants; and public support for the decisions which are taken at the end
of the procedure... Levine, P., A. Fung, and J. Gastil. "Future Directions for Public
Deliberation," Journal of Public Deliberation 1, no. 1 (2005): 2. Depending on the authors,
the list can be lengthened according to their perception of what constitutes a "fair balance
of expression," and the greater or lesser strictness of the link between deliberation and the
final decision. It is out of the question, here, to enter into all the details which characterize
a deliberative procedure. My point here is to emphasize that the determination of the
different dimensions of the deliberation does not stem from the declination of a normative
ideal; rather, a deliberation can be evaluated with respect to an empirical definition of an
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these derive from the Theory of Communicative Action (TAC) and
Habermas's conception of language, as we will see later. Even if it is
not necessarily explicitly invoked by the actors who define the
procedures in a particular concrete case, the dominant paradigm is
thus that of communicative action.
In this text, I wish to examine the following hypothesis. By
considering that the source of normative legitimacy resides in
communicative action, Habermas's theory grounds the capacity to
legitimate value preferences in modern societies in linguistic
exchanges, on account of the pragmatic dimension of language. A
critical point that this theoretical framework neglects is the co-
constitutive relation between language and the medium in which it is
inscribed: language is marked, without being determined, by the
medium. This theory also neglects the socio-cultural dimension of
any media on which communicational activity deploys itself. Thus,
the processes whereby the information and communication
technologies (ICT) are appropriated by their users take place in a
socio-political context, and this context strongly influences the
language that is employed and the uses that are made of these
technologies, as has been well demonstrated by the sociology of use. 13
By restricting his analysis of the emergence of norms to the sole
dimension of linguistic exchanges,14 Habermas weakens its contact
with real societies and embodied individuals, and ends up
conceptualising an abstract essence of an ontological and discursive
nature. Because of this, he is unable to conceptualise and take
properly into account the new forms of expression related to the new
communication technologies which have made their appearance over
the course of the last century. The linguistic forms which are
elaborated when individuals succeed in appropriating new media are
the vehicles of value-laden choices which circulate in the public arena,
just as is the case for written and spoken language. The failure to
recognise these new forms leads to neglecting the particular values
which can be conveyed by a cinema film, a television series, a personal
point of view on a blog, or even the narrative construction involved
when intervening in a public debate.
"ideal type" in a Weberian exception. In other words, my inclination tends toward a more
descriptive and evaluative understanding of deliberation than a substantive one.
13 Thierry Vedel, "Sociologie des Innovations Technologiques des Usagers: Introduction a
une Socio-politique des Usages," in Mdias et nouvelles technologies pour une socio-
politique des usages, ed. A. Vitalis (Rennes: Editions Apogee, 1994), 13-43.
141 will deal later with the small amount of space he offers to non-verbal emotions in the
deliberative process.
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Although these criticisms have already been noted by some major
authors, they have not yet lead to the formulation of an alternative
foundation for the theory of deliberation. 15 The point is not to
question the paradigm of communicative action as the central process
in normative agreement, but to enlarge its scope by taking other
modes of expression into consideration as sources of normative
production.16 The aim of the present text is to sketch the outlines of a
new approach to the theory of deliberation, based on the theory of
"creative action" proposed by H. Joas, which meets this requirement.
Thus, in the first section of this text, I will review the scope of
relevance of the theory of communicative action grounded in
language. I will then, in the second section, present the main tenets of
the theory of creative action, and I will attempt to show that this
theory opens the way to a broader approach to the theory of
deliberation in section three. In particular, it becomes possible to
understand how non-argumentative and/or non-linguistic modes of
expression can intervene in the construction of value preferences.
This makes it possible to include in deliberative processes those
persons who, even though they do not master the forms of expression
that are necessary from the point of view of Habermasian theory, are
nevertheless well able to express their view of the world through other
modalities. This will lead to our conclusion that one of the most
important features of Information and Communication Technologies
(ICT) in deliberative procedures is that it has the potential to promote
new forms of expression grounded in various perceptive and cognitive
experiments. I hope to show that values and norms-voiced in
different manners by citizens-cannot be detached from a cognitive
perception of the world; therefore, deliberative procedures have to be
evaluated more broadly than discursive arguments.
15 Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy," in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1992), 109-42; Seyla Benhabib, "Towards a Deliberative Model of
Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. S. Benhabib (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-87; Jane Mansbridge, "Everyday Talk in the
Deliberative System," in Deliberative Politics, ed. S. Macedo (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 211-39; Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the Other: Beyond
Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the
Political, ed. S. Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 120-35; Iris
Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
16 There are, of course, non-deliberative political theories where the legitimacy of a decision
is not evaluated with respect to a process of discussion, but rather on the basis of the
authorities who take the decision. The present text is not situated in this sort of non-
deliberative framework.
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II. THE LIMITS OF THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
GROUNDED IN LANGUAGE
In the most recent version of his theory, Habermas frames the
deployment of communicative action by an institutionalisation of the
procedures enabling the emergence of normative structures through
democratic discussion. "The theory of discussion considers that the
success of deliberative politics does not depend on the existence of a
group of citizens capable of collective action, but depends rather on
the institutionalisation of procedures and conditions which are
suitable for communication, and on the combined effects of
institutionalised deliberations and public opinions which are formed
in an informal way."17 These "suitable" conditions for communication
stem from a conception of deliberation anchored in the pragmatic
dimension of language: Habermas considers that the basis of potential
validity in inter-subjective relations resides in the epistemic function
of discourse. He thus restricts the deployment of communicative
action to certain forms of linguistic expression, and thereby excludes
the majority of modes of human communication. In this view,
rational communication excludes artistic expressions, such as
photography, films, cartoons, etc. It also excludes those linguistic
exchanges which do not measure up to the requirements for
producing a valid norm in the framework of the TAC, such as
exchanges which are severely burdened by non-transparent conditions
of expression, or submitted to symbolic forms of domination. To be
fair, Habermas does consider non-verbal expression of emotions as
part of-and even necessary for-deliberation. As Neblo quite
convincingly demonstrates, argumentative reason does not stand for
emotionless and cold-blooded expression, but rather for a reflexive
movement of reason against power and domination. 18 Emotions are
intertwined in various ways with argumentation and rhetoric in
general, and those are part of discourse ethics.19
17 Jiirgen Habermas, Droit et D6mocratie Entre Faits et Normes (Paris: Gallimard, 1996
[1992]), 323.
18 Michael Neblo, "Family Disputes" (see n. 6); see also Michael Neblo, "Impassioned
Democracy: The Role of Emotion in Deliberative Theory." The Democracy Collaborative
Affiliates Conference (Washington, D.C., 2003),
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/mneblo/papers/EmotComb.pdf.
19 For further discussion of Professor Neblo's twelve roles for emotion in Deliberative
Theory, see Neblo, "Impassioned Democracy" (see n. 18).
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On the basis of a critical reading of the second Wittgenstein, in
particular the linguistic turn and the emphasis on the pragmatic
dimension of speech acts, Habermas concludes that the very structure
of language introduces an imminent relation to truth. The
illocutionary component of every speech act can serve as the basis for
an inter-subjective agreement and thus give rise to the emergence of
an agreed norm.20  Therefore, in a deliberative process, a specific
inter-subjective relationship occurs, which engages the speaker
through performative assertions: its utterance expresses validity
claims which place the speaker and the addressee in a common
epistemic dynamic. In this frame, every inter-subjective
communication seeking consensus contains validity claims.
Habermas distinguishes four categories: comprehensibility, 21
truthfulness ,22 truth, 23 and legitimacy.24 The exchange of arguments
can result in the appearance of "true" propositions: the obligatory
character of the norm derives from the inter-subjective modalities of
its production.
2o Despite various interpretations among academics, in speech act theory developed by
Austin and Searle, the illocutionary component of language wants to establish a distinction
between the propositional content of an utterance and its intentional dimension which can
produce effects on the audience. By saying "It is hot in this room,"the speaker both makes
a statement and asks the addressee to open the window. Austin and speech act theorists
usually refers to the "illocutionaryforce" as the property of an utterance to be made with
the intention to perform a certain illocutionary act. It is this intention that Habermas tries
to capture through his analysis of the epistemic dimension of deliberation.
21 "The speaker associates each effectual statement with the claim that the symbolical
expression employed is liable to be understood in the given situation." Habermas,
Sociologie et Thgorie du Langage (Paris: Armand Colin, 1995), 76 (author's translation
from French).
22 "All statements which are expressive in the narrow sense (feeling, desires, expressions of
a will) imply a claim to sincerity. This claim appears to be false when and if it is discovered
that the speaker did not actually have such intentions in the way that he expressed them."
Ibid., 77.
23 "The observations, the affirmations, the explanations, imply a claim to truth. This claim
is not legitimate if the state of affairs that is affirmed does not exist. I call this use of
language 'cognitive.' In this case, we enter into communication seeking to know something
about objective reality." Ibid.
24 "All statements which have a normative orientation (orders, advice, promises, etc.) imply
a claim to fairness. This claim is illegitimate when the norms in question cannot be
justified. I call this use of language 'communicative.' In this case, we mention something
which exists in the world, in order to create certain interpersonal relations." Ibid., 77.
[Vol. 5:1
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"Communicative reason" emanates from these validity claims and
results from the aptitude to language of every human being. The rigid
linguistic framework within which Habermas encloses this concept of
communicative reason is thus extremely powerful, since it derives
from the simple facts of human nature! It is because we are endowed
with language that we can engage in rational argument (i.e. discourse
in which valid propositions can be affirmed) and by this means reach
a normative consensus.
There would probably be no problem with this if such
"communicative reason" did not become, in Habermas's theory of
action, the sole alternative to instrumental reason. The existence of a
"communicative reason" is quite convincing as long as one is engaged
in constructing a theory of rationality; the problem comes when
Habermas uses this as a basis for a general analysis of society in terms
of a binary theory of action. The binary alternative between
"communication" and "system" radicalizes the opposition between
language, which is an attribute of human beings, and technological
devices, which authorize an effective coordination of action in
complex societies. There are two serious problems with this analysis.
First, how do we match validity claims and the production of
norms with real life experience if this is all a linguistic process? For
Habermas, language is not an arbitrary convention but, is the link
between reality and sensory experience; it is both complex and
indirect, and mediates all contacts with our environment. Thus,
although he does not draw all the consequences of the fact, Habermas
does admit that the environment has a structuring effect on language
for those who interact with the environment. This explains why the
rules of grammar cannot be compared to the rules of chess, or the
development of vocabulary to the number of pawns on the board.
However, although Habermas does take into account the fact that
there is something more fundamental in language than in the rules of
a game, he stops short and does not go beyond the recognition that
language, being a specifically human attribute, cannot be considered
as an external artefact. Because of this, Habermas comes to two
important conclusions which are, I think, mistaken.
First, although he does recognise that language is influenced by
sensory experience, he considers that this influence does not play a
structural role because the content of language is provided by the
cognitive activity of the individual which, in his approach, does not
appear to be linked with perception. At best, one could say that the
determinants of language are biological and depend on the degree of
development of the vital organs necessary for the appearance of
language.
2009]
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Second, and more profoundly, Habermas disconnects the
approach to truth, via the inter-subjective process of the formation of
value preferences, from sensory experience of the world. According to
Habermas, a human being is first and foremost reflexive, in the sense
that his linguistic and cognitive capacities are what enable him to
engage in communicative action. Hence, the validity of the norms
which are established through communication and which guide action
does not depend on the sensory experience of individuals, or only very
marginally. To put it rather bluntly, such a human being is
disembodied. This is actually quite coherent with Habermas's
position that the apprehension of truth cannot be achieved with
reference to reality since the latter, being mediated by language, is not
directly accessible to the individual.
In opposition to the theories of truth-as-reflection, according to
which truth consists of an adequate correspondence between the
propositional statement and reality, 25 Habermas considers that
"truth" is a human construction in which experience is mediated by
argument. Thus, by refusing an ontological conception of the world,
Habermas goes to the other extreme and makes the mistake of
refusing to admit that the cognitive process and knowledge have a
sensory dimension. He is therefore obliged to pose two conditions for
speech acts giving rise to purportedly true statements to also be
rational: they should not enter into contradiction with experience and
they should receive the assent of all. Thus, Habermas is obliged to
reintroduce, a minima and in negative fashion, what he started out by
carefully excluding, i.e. the grounding of language in sensory
experience. Indeed, if one wants to avoid considering that any sort of
Utopian consensus could serve as a basis for the deployment of
communicative action, speech acts do have to be rooted in sensory
experience. However, this grudging reintroduction remains very
limited, since it acts merely as a safeguard against the use of
counterfactual propositions. This is a far cry from fully taking into
account the way in which sensory perception of the world can actually
structure discursive arguments.
The second serious problem with Habermas's analysis emerges
because of the normative dimension of deliberation. In writings
subsequent to Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas and many
other theoreticians of deliberation address this normative dimension,
since all of them recognise the great difficulties involved in actually
satisfying the theoretical requirements for rational argument in any
25 For example: the propositional statement "the snow is white" is true if and only if there is
some snow, and the snow is white.
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given empirical context. 26 Mendelberg summarises this line of
reasoning:
The research reviewed here sounds a cautionary note about
deliberation. When groups engage in discussion, we cannot
count on them to generate empathy and diminish narrow
self-interest, to afford equal opportunities for participation
and influence even to the powerless, to approach the
discussion with a mind open to change, and to be influenced
not by social pressures, unthinking commitments to social
identities, or power, but by the exchange of relevant and
sound reasons.
Contrary to Pellizzoni, who thinks that "this is a weak objection, the
theory represents a regulatory ideal, a benchmark against which the
existing institutions or the reformist projects can be measured," one
can insist on the strong link between those normative assumptions
and the theoretical procedural frame in which they embed deliberative
discussions.28 My point here is not to advocate a more substantial
approach to deliberation, but to stress that Habermas's normative
proceduralism derives from his philosophy of language as we have
seen above.
By subjecting argumentation to normative constraints, the
communicational paradigm imposes strict procedural conditions
which are necessary for the inter-subjective expression, via speech
acts, of requirements for validity. According to the deliberative
approach, the institutionalisation of this sort of procedure constitutes
a safeguard for a democratic production of norms. "The procedures
and the communicative conditions for the democratic formation of
public will and opinion are the corner-pieces of the rationalisation by
means of discussion of the decisions taken by a government and an
Administration bound by laws and by justice."29 On this basis, a
26 "Even under favourable conditions, no complex society could ever correspond to the
model of purely communicative social relations." Habermas, Droit et D~mocratie Entre
Faits et Normes, 326 (see n. 17).
27 T. Mendelberg, and C. Karpowitz, "How People Deliberate about Justice," in Can the
People Govern?, ed. S. Rosenberg (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1o8.
28 L. Pellizzoni, "The Myth of the Best Argument: Power, Deliberation and Reason," British
Journal of Sociology 52, no. I (March 2001): 69.
29 Habermas, Droit et D6mocratie Entre Faits etNormes, 325 (seen. 17).
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difficult question raises its head: what is to be done in those
situations, which are frequent indeed, where it is practically
impossible-for diverse reasons (lack of competence, absence of
organized partners for the discussion, urgency leaving insufficient
time to organize a debate, non-acceptance by some or all of the
partners of the organization of the discussion, etc.)-to organize a
discussion under the demanding conditions necessary for the validity
of the deliberation? How is it possible to find a solution to a conflict
if, by construction, discussion and linguistic exchanges constitute the
only possibility for the creation of norms? Habermas is very clear on
this point: in order to avoid violent conflict, "we have no other option
than to accept to enter into a practice of agreement where we are not
at liberty to determine the procedures and the communicational
conditions."30 This sort of assertion severely limits the relevance of
this conception of communicative action. One cannot decently
propose, as the sole and unique rational means of solving a conflict, a
framework for exchanges which only suits those speakers who master
the requisite codes which enable them to impose their point of view.
That amounts to systematically favouring the social elites who possess
the cultural equipment necessary for this sort of procedure.3l
This discussion leads us to a final comment. There are two aspects
in this normative conception of deliberation. The first one is a
normative judgment concerning the superiority of discussion instead
of various forms of social domination in order to elaborate legitimate
norms in modern societies. The second one is linked to the conditions
under which a discussion might produce valid norms. In
Habermasian theory these two aspects are inseparable, since the
deployment of communicative action necessitates the fulfilment of
procedural requirements. My point here is that this link depends on
an invalid conception of language and cognition, one which we can
abandon without giving up the former sense of normativity; this also
has procedural consequences as we shall see in section three.
Deliberation as a normative goal certainly has its utility in
contemporary democracies, where it can constitute an incentive for
politicians and gives us something to strive for as citizens. We may
conclude this section by saying that the deliberative paradigm, as it is
expressed in terms of procedural requirements and argumentative
constraints, depends on theoretical linguistic premises which do not
allow us to take into consideration the complexity of interactions
30 Tbid., 336.
31 Young, Inclusion and Democracy (see n. 15).
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which are expressed in the public arena. In order to include other
means of expression and other forms of agreement in the process of
the emergence of social and political norms, we will therefore need to
mobilize other theoretical resources.
III. THE MODEL OF CREATiVE ACTION: REINTRODUCING SENSORY
EXPERIENCE INTO THE SPACE OF ACTION
I shall start from the critique of classical models of rational action
formulated by H. Joas, 32 and then go on to develop the new
perspectives offered by the paradigm of "creative action" that he
proposes. This new theoretical approach will make it possible to
reconcile the normative necessity of an inter-subjective agreement as
the source of the legitimacy of value preferences, with a wide variety of
forms of expression that citizens of all sorts can employ to put forward
their own particular versions of "the truth." A particularly important
point, as we shall see, is that this new paradigm displaces the source of
normative creation from the structure of language to the perceptual
activity of the individual. To summarize briefly, we can say that by
restoring the fundamentally creative dimension of action, Joas
reincarnates action in the body of human beings. This makes it
possible to understand how the great variety of experiences of the
world, which enrich the differences between human beings, can
become a precious resource in a deliberative process where everyone
should be able to find their place.
A. FOR A CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL THEORIES OF ACTION
Joas takes as his starting point the observation that while
sociological theories of action have not completely ignored the
creative dimension of action (for example, by the analysis of
charismatic themes), these theories have never managed to propose a
satisfactory integration of this dimension in a general theory of action.
Creativity has always been the object of a separate analysis, either as a
residual category of rational action, or as a category which is quite
distinct from all other human activities. Joas, however, maintains
that all human action contains a creative aspect, which sociological
theories of action do not succeed in taking into account. It is thus not
32 Communicative Action: Essays on Jiurgen Habermas's Theory of Communicative
Action, eds. A. Honneth and H. Joas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991); The Creativity
ofAction (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996).
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a question of creating a supplementary category in which all "creative"
human activities could be regrouped; on the contrary, it is necessary
to question the very foundations of all the theories of action which
take "rational action" as the basic model for the regulation of human
behaviours.
Taking his inspiration from pragmatic philosophy, Joas considers
that there are two major problems with taking "rational action" as the
starting-point for a theory of action in general. First, taking "rational
action" as the starting-point leads directly to creating a counter-
category, that of "non-rational action," which is inevitably considered
as normatively undesirable. Second, this approach leads to
regrouping in the same counter-category a very heterogeneous set of
actions which stem from very different motivations, ranging from
emotional actions to a considered amoral act. These problems stem
from three fundamental postulates of theories of rational action: they
presuppose that the subject is able to act in the pursuit of a goal; they
assume that the subject has a perfect mastery of his body; and finally
they assume that the subject is autonomous with respect to his peers
and to his environment. Those who defend the principle of rational
action as the normative model for action in general know full well that
the overwhelming majority of real actions that can be empirically
observed do not fit into the ideal categories of "rational action." This
leads to a theoretical mistake: instead of admitting the empirical
evidence that the theory of rational action is severely limited,
proponents of this theory have criticized human behaviour itself,
which they consider as deficient because it is "irrational."
Joas proposes to establish a model of creative action which
encompasses rational action and normative action; the extension of
their domain of heuristic relevance is determined pragmatically by
defining their conditions of application. Joas's method consists of
criticizing the three presuppositions of the theory of rational action.
Here, I will concentrate on the critique of the first postulate, and the
consequences of this for the subject of deliberative politics.
This first postulate proposes a teleological vision of action: people
act in pursuit of an explicit goal. This postulate is continually
contradicted in daily experience, where means and ends interact in a
subtle fashion such that it is highly implausible to suppose that
subjects have a perfectly clear view of the goal to be achieved. It is
indeed an essential error to consider that the goal of an action can be
constituted independently of the action itself. A hypothetical world in
which individuals first fix explicit goals, and then accomplish them,
presupposes that individuals have adequate knowledge of the
environment within which they act, that they set goals compatible
with this knowledge, and that they adapt their actions accordingly.
MONNOYER-SM1TH
The key point is that in this schema, the teleological interpretation of
intentionality is necessarily linked to dissociation between knowledge
and action. Now, as Dewey emphasized long ago, this only happens in
the rare cases when the actor is perfectly equipped from the start, so
that during the course of his action he does not engage in any reflexive
activity. Normally, actors adapt both their actions and goals in the
light of knowledge gained during the course of the activity itself. It is
because Habermas considers that human beings are (almost) entirely
constituted in language that they appear strangely disembodied, and
the emergence of knowledge through perceptual action is
correspondingly underestimated. This conception of action is
congruent with recent research in cognitive science, because the
constitution of knowledge strongly depends on people's aptitude to
perceive the environment through movement and action.33
In order to reintroduce the embodiment of human action, and
thus to reveal its creativity, Joas proposes to envisage perception and
knowledge as phases of action, so that action itself can be redirected
as a function of the context. This theoretical reversal has a spectacular
consequence: our very perception is structured by our activity and our
experience as active subjects. "Our perception is not aimed at the
reality of the world 'in itself; the object of our perception is the
practical use of that which is perceived in the context of our activity."34
It follows that human action entertains a constitutive relation with the
contextual situation: it is for this reason that action is fundamentally
creative. Action results from a reflexive judgement which bears on the
context and the suitability of the action to be performed, and this
action leads to the construction of (relevant) knowledge of the
environment. This does not mean that the situation unilaterally
determines the action; that would be going to the opposite extreme,
and would represent a serious behaviourist reduction. What it does
mean is that an individual can only perceive a situation to the extent
that he is able to act. Conversely, the nature of the resulting action is
guided by the constructed perception of the situation in which the
subject finds himself. In other words, the motivations and the plans
for action result from a reflexive evaluation of a perceived context;
they are not the causes of the action.
34 H. Joas, La Cr~ativit de l'agir (Paris: Editions le Cref, 1992), 169.
33 E. Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
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B. FORMS OF CREATIVE ACTION
This pragmatic conception of action, which considers that all
human action has a creative dimension (this goes even for routine
actions which may result), opens up interesting perspectives for a
theory of deliberation which aims at understanding the mechanisms
for the emergence of a norm, in the framework of a theory of
democracy. One of the strong points of Joas's work is to propose a
theory of action which encompasses all human action, without
imposing a normative dimension. He distinguishes three levels of
creativity:
0 Primary creativity, which corresponds to "primary"
processes such as imagination, the ability to form a
representation of a situation, such as play, games,
risk, enthusiasm.
* Secondary creativity, which corresponds to the
production of novelty in the world, whatever its
object, whether it is scientific, technological, or
artistic.
0 Integrated creativity, which corresponds to taking a
reflexive and critical distance with respect to
secondary creativity. It "associates an opening in
self-expression with a responsibility for self-
control.
3 5
Each level of creativity presupposes the preceding level, so that
integrated creativity appears as the crowning achievement of a process
of self-realisation by appropriating the world, a process which
proceeds by the realisation of values and putting them into
perspective.
By grounding human action in creativity, Joas articulates the
conditions under which a culture and its related norms and values can
be deployed, through the manipulation of their environment by
human beings. As a source of personal accomplishment and of
creation of values, the perceptual activity of the individual is also
applicable to the technological artefacts which surround him. In other
35 Ibid., 269.
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words, according to the type of perceptive experience a person has
with his or her technical and human environment, values will emerge
through manipulation, discussion, creation and so on. The
fundamental difference between Habermas and Joas lies in this
pragmatic construction of norms, which exceeds argumentative
exchanges but surely includes these discussions.
The multiplication of sensory stimulations produced by
technological devices not only obliges the actor to engage in intense,
pre-reflexive activity, but also to engage in intense activity just to
apprehend them. The difficulty of this task explains the absence of
values and the lack of a coherent vision of the world, which is the lot of
the citizens of contemporary societies. In this sense, we must admit
that there is some point to the popular saying "things were simpler
before." It is indeed true that the frenetic rhythm of technical,
scientific and economic innovation puts a strain on traditional values.
Moreover, the impossibility for all citizens to have an equal
apprehension of these innovations produces violent discrepancies.
This is what Joas calls the "crisis of integrated creativity."36
IV. CREATIVITY IN THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS:
A PROCESS OF INCLUSION
Starting from these theoretical considerations, how may we
reconstruct a more inclusive concept of deliberation freed from the
epistemological constraints of the theory of communicative action? It
is beyond the ambitions of this article to give a complete answer to
this question. I shall merely propose some outlines for
conceptualizing the issues.
A. OUTLINES FOR A NEW APPROACH TO DELIBERATION
To the extent that it is no longer a question of setting up the
conditions for achieving a rational discursive exchange, the procedural
constraints related to these conditions disappear. In return, we now
have to define the conditions for the practice and the development of
creative action and to specify the procedural devices which are apt to
ensure the respect of these conditions. As we have seen, creative
action does not necessarily have a normative dimension.37 It is thus
36 Ibid., 268.
37 There is room for discussion here concerning the normative dimension of the "integrated
creativity" of Joas. This author considers that the moral indifference of post-modern
authors resides in a crisis in the realization of values and in the absence of reflexive
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quite possible that a restricted perception of the environment can be
translated, expressed and reinforced by the performance of actions
which are in contradiction with the values and the world-views shared
by a part of the population. To the extent that the action which lies at
the source of the emergence of norms and value-preferences cannot be
considered a priori as "rational" merely because it allows the
performance of desirable actions-and vice versa-we have to admit
the necessity of regulatory principles of action which are in
accordance with the requirements of the concept of deliberative
democracy. At this level, we may distinguish two main categories of
principles: those which lie beyond action, and those which precede
action. Preceding the action, there is the normative determination of
the conditions for the emergence of creative action. As a parallel to
Lawrence Lessig's work on cyberspace, the architecture of our
environment (its "code") regulates our capacities for action in the
world and hence our capacities for perception.38 We will first examine
this latter category of principles.
(1) To what extent does a theory of deliberation require that we
pose normative conditions for the realisation of creative action?
There can only be deliberation on a condition that the individuals who
participate (at least virtually) possess the capacity to freely form their
value-preferences on the basis of a free perception of the world. In
this sense, their capacity for action and for perception of their
environment must be as large as possible: what is at stake is to
provide a normative guarantee of the conditions for the practice of
deliberation. Conversely, the more our capacity for perception is
organized, the smaller the latitude for action will be. Creative action is
therefore canalized by the limits of the architecture which organizes
perception of the environment. The massive intervention of a
government in the perception and the understanding of the world by
its citizens can be interpreted as a violation of this principle. The
examples are legion, and illustrate the immense creativity that a ruling
power can deploy when it wishes to ensure the docility of the masses
without having overly ostensible recourse to brute force. Controlling
the access to the world, by giving only a truncated image of it, is thus
one of the great traditions of authoritarian regimes: from the
mandates given to court artists charged with recounting history on the
distance which is necessary for creative integration. In the search for self-responsibility
there is probably the affirmation of a value preference- unless one interprets (as Joas
seems to do) the fact of taking a distance with respect to morality and responsibility, not as
moral in itself, but as a creative attitude which allows its perpetual realization.
38 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
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walls of the temple of Luxor, to the control of all Internet connections
by North Korea, passing by control of the press3 9 and censorship, the
politics of truncating the span of real experience is a key element in
the techniques of propaganda.4O
It is therefore necessary to organize the structures which constrain
action in such a way that action can be deployed in the most
constructive way possible, both for the individual and for society. This
principle of justice has been well analysed by political philosophy- in
particular by the work of J. Rawls and K.O. Appel.41 When going
further into the difficulties involved, we will note here that a first level
of normative requirements for a theory of deliberation based on
recognition of creative action is that of the transparency of the
constraints on action and perception.
Here again, the work of Lawrence Lessig is highly heuristic for
modelling the diverse sorts of influence that a political regime can
bring to bear on the very architecture of the material environment
which is offered to our perceptual activity. Lessig details the four
types of constraints which are brought to bear on an individual
moving in a given environment:
* The law, which directly regulates behaviours;
* Social norms, which also impose a certain sort of
behaviour through social pressure;
39 This control is not necessarily exerted in an overtly authoritarian way. Subtle processes
of auto-censorship have been well described by Noam Chomsky with respect to the
American press. Cf. N. Chomsky and E. Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002), 3.
40 1 do not wish to enter here into a typology of the modes of propaganda, and its
deployment by dictatorial countries. I refer here to a vast literature in political science and
communication science which bears on the forms of contemporary propaganda, since C.
Hovland studies on WW II. Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of the Mass Media, (see n. 39); Charaudeau, et al., La T616vision et la Guerre
(Brussels: De Boeck Universit6, 2001). On information in war-time, see also P.M. Taylor,
War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1992); P.M. Taylor, "War, Media and Propaganda in the Gulf
Wars," (APSA Colloquium, Chicago, Illinois, September 2004). The essential point here is
only to show that the absence of access to the real world constitutes a decisive obstacle to
the formation of creative action.
41 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1999 [1971]); J. Rawls, Political Liberalism. The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 4; K.O. Appel, Athique de la Discussion
(Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1994).
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* The market, which acts on prices and/or the
availability of products and services, and which thus
orients individuals in their choices; and
" The architecture of the environment (this can be a
technological architecture, a "code," or a material
configuration, as we have seen above).42
These various constraints limit the capacities of the individual to
act and to perceive; they act as prisms for the cognitive capacity of
individuals. In Western democracies, the pre-eminent role played by
the legal system guarantees, in principle, that the constraints which
are exerted on individuals are established in a transparent fashion,
following political debate which is relayed by the media in a public
arena. We know only too well, of course, that in actual practice this is
far from the case; but it remains as a normative ideal which depends
on the vigilance of the citizen, and a certain number of constitutional
guarantees that we shall not analyse in detail here. An important
point for a theory of deliberation, as reconceptualised here, is thus to
emphasize that it requires a normative conception of constraints on
creative action. This does not mean that these constraints should be
abolished (which is impossible), or even that they should be reduced
to a minimum. Rather, these constraints should be established in a
transparent manner and, as much as possible, they should be
reversible. When controlling our perception of the environment by
promulgating a rule of law, the institutional organs which participate
in the elaboration of the law should commit themselves (this is the
normative dimension) to the publicity, transparency and reversibility
of the law. This is crucial in order to authorize a reflexive process on
the part of the civic actor, because it is only by such a process that the
adaptation of value-preferences to perceptual action is made possible.
By making it possible to step back and take a critical view of the
constraints on individual action, this normative requirement ensures
the possibility for the "integrated creativity" of Joas to emerge: it
makes it possible to become critically aware of the relationship
between a normative structure and the architecture of the
environment in which a community evolves. This explains, for
example, the importance of public discussions concerning the text of
the legislation which adapts the copyright laws to widespread piracy
42 Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, 85 (see n. 38).
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on the Web.43 This legislation contains a series of measures which
directly influence the market of artistic creation, and hence the
possibility for artists to earn a living by their production, and more
fundamentally to express themselves. The vitality of a society finds an
important outlet in its artistic creativity, and so a modification of the
internal architecture of copyright has important repercussions beyond
the determination of their modes of remuneration, and comes to
confront traditional values of our society which posit the freedom of
artistic creation.
(2) Once the principle that the constraints on action should be
transparent is established, the modalities whereby creative action can
be included in the deliberative process still need to be established,
with consideration to the emergence of value preferences. What is at
stake is to construct an open concept of deliberative democracy which
recognises the interest of creative expression, all the while canalizing
such expression towards the justification of value preferences, under
conditions which should themselves be defined as a function of value
preferences. In other words, in this new context, the deliberative
process recognises on the one hand the existence of diverse perceptual
modalities and actions which are not to be limited to purely
argumentative exchanges and, on the other hand, the deliberative
process which has to structure itself in such a way as to integrate such
modalities according to a principle of inclusion and which contributes
to its legitimacy. In this sense, even when it is reconceptualised on a
renewed theoretical basis, deliberation remains a procedural notion to
the extent that the satisfactions of democratic requirements which are
embodied in the process of deliberation appear to need a certain form
of organization.
According to our approach, the normative dimension of the
concept of deliberation can quite well be restricted to its democratic
and inclusive goal as it serves a democratic purpose. Thus, the
procedural design does not have to meet the right conditions for
validity claims expression, but should guarantee a wide range of
expression confronting value preferences. A couple of consequences
need to be stressed here. First, there is no such thing as one best
procedural arrangement. In general, the normative dimension of the
whole process rests on its democratic value, depending on local
contexts and on the level of the normative conflicts at stake.
Creativity in the ability to stimulate grass-root communication should
431 am referring here to the DADVSI Act (Law on copyrights and related rights in the
information society) passed in 2006 in France.
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(and often is, locally) be encouraged as long as is serves the objective
to express value preferences.44
Second, even though these democratic goals are only partially
reached because of local empirical conditions and political contexts,
the normative dimension of deliberation as we understand it, will only
affect the democratic legitimacy of its outcomes, not the aptitude of
individuals to express value preferences or the ability of shared norms
to emerge out of inter-subjective communication. Defining
deliberation should not then consist of exhaustively defining all the
procedural conditions which are necessary for the deployment of
communicative reason, whose content varies according to conception
that different authors may have of ideal role taking and the emergence
of norms through discussion. Rather, we can very easily define
deliberation as the exchange of value preferences through
communication, be it mediated or face to face. The definition doesn't
need to be grounded on linguistic arguments and can take the form of
any semiotic content which reveals its normative claim.
In this theoretical perspective there are two levels of analysis of a
deliberative process: the sociological one (how does this arrangement
allow people to express their value preferences?) and the normative
one (does this arrangement correspond to our ideal type-in the
Weberian sense-of deliberation in contemporary democracies?).
This allows us to break the link between the local conditions of
realisation of a procedure, which can be more or less deliberative, and
its normative evaluation, which apprehends the legitimacy of its
outcomes in a democratic context. In this way, an appreciation of the
quality of a deliberation is rooted in the real world, taking into
consideration the concrete circumstances in which deliberation takes
place. The normative dimension of the analysis can even be neglected
by the researcher without introducing a theoretical and logical bias in
the study.
It follows that the different procedural requirements that we have
already encountered, such as the transparency of the deliberative
organization and the inclusion of the concerned public, cannot
constitute a set of criteria with a view to defining an "ideal deliberative
procedure" (that cannot exist anyway). Rather, these procedural
44 An example of this local debate on urban planning in France can be seen when a local
association (les arpenteurs- "the pacers") proposes a walk of citizens through the
concerned neighbourhood with maps and drawings to help them concretely realize the
various aspects of the projects. Citizens can then take pictures and propose their vision of
the future site.
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desiderata 45 constitute many clues that can be taken into
consideration when evaluating the greater or lesser degree of
deliberation. These procedural requirements can also be used to
evaluate its adequacy to a democratic normative standard, but this
constitutes another type of evaluation.
The main difference with the approach of Habermas, from that of
Joas, is that procedural rules are no longer subordinate to the
linguistic nature of rational action: the normative conception of
deliberation, which depends on the realisation of ideal conditions of
communication so that communicational action can be deployed, no
longer holds sway. This is probably one of the greatest advantages of
this reformulation of the theory of action: the procedural rules of
deliberation can no longer be a question of an "ideal speech situation"
which leads to a procedural formalism with the awkward property of
systematically excluding a certain category of the population. The
regulation of communication is no longer limited to argumentative
exchanges, but (as proposed by I.M. Young) can perfectly well include
more narrative forms, such as the account of an experience, rhetorical
figures of speech such as metaphor or hyperbole, or yet again the
expression of motivations. (Young calls these "greetings," i.e. the
recognition of the subjective motivations of the speaker.) In addition,
it becomes possible to open the procedure to new forms of
participation which result from an appropriation of new technologies,
and of the Internet in particular (through the use of forums, blogs,
chats, and other forms of expression via the ICT)- all the forms of
individual expression which result from the deployment of creative
action in a given environment and which give rise to modes of
expression that are not yet explicitly conceptualised. Concretely, this
could lead (for example) to the integration in a public debate of more
"artistic" elements (films, a photographic exhibition, a television
series, or songs) as elements of an argumentation (for example, a Ken
Loach film on British violence in Northern Ireland46 or a de Palma
film/documentary on the war in Iraq,47 etc.).
45 Latin word meaning, "something you want."
46 The Wind that Shakes the Barley (2oo6).
47 Redacted (2oo8).
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B. AN APPROACH TO DELIBERATION OPENED TO
EMERGING POLITICAL PRACTICES
An important consequence of a non-normative approach to
deliberation is, at an empirical level, its heuristic utility. In this new
approach, the deliberative ideal no longer constitutes an obstacle to
the recognition of procedures which are authentically deliberative, but
which do not fully meet the requirements imposed by a normative
perspective, which are by definition impossible to achieve. Applying
this standard, social scientists will be confronted with the task of
describing all the forms of communication which can be observed
during the course of a debate, the value-judgements that they reveal,
and their evolution during the course of the resulting discussions. The
deliberation will also be evaluated with respect to its inclusive
dimension,48 and the transparency of its rules of functioning. Thus, a
process can be evaluated as more or less deliberative, depending on
the way that it satisfies compromises or negotiates with its different
components so as to achieve the richest communication possible
between the participants. The research question should then be to
analyse the multiple exchanges between the participants in order to
measure the inclusive and reflexive potential of the process. On an
empirical level, it is the totality of all the modes of communication
that can be considered as contributing to the deliberation. This
conceptualisation of deliberation constitutes a superb opening to the
imagination and the creativity that individuals are capable of
manifesting when they are invited to express the values of their points
of view.
On the basis of these theoretical considerations, an important
characteristic of deliberative procedures, as newly defined, must be
mentioned. It follows from what we have said that deliberative
processes, thanks to their dimensions of real-time learning and the
confrontation with world-views quite different from those familiar to
most participants in the debate, offer new opportunities for action and
for the deployment of creative action. These new opportunities are
what Joas notes when he insists on the current potential for
developing creative action:
The concept of participation covers today what remains,
after the tendencies to privatisation, of a desire to live one's
48 Not in a normative perspective but a sociological one: are the individuals participating in
the process able to express themselves?
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sociality directly and publicly, a desire to carry out a creative
and effective activity in the bosom of the community. By
participating in politico-cultural organisations and
institutions, as well as in the social movements which
constitute the ever-shifting basis of democracy, an individual
can ally in indissoluble fashion the rational pursuit of his
interest, the moral obligation, and his creative flowering.
49
The processes of deliberation have a link-sometimes more or less
slender-with the processes of decision.50 To the extent that this link
is real, deliberation constitutes an opportunity to take responsibility at
a collective level, and is thus a practical form of integrated creativity.
However, as Joas takes care to point out, it is important that
deliberation should not merely correspond "to simple interested
motives, or to a normative injunction having no relation to personal
accomplishment in personal life. Conversely, there would be no point
in trying to instrumentalize participation with a view to personal
accomplishment interpreted in a purely individual sense
Participation takes place in an equilibrium that each person must
discover for himself, between different modes of action." 51 This
conception of deliberation proposes to view the deployment and the
49 Joas, La CrativitM de l'agir, 269 (see n. 34).
50 The question of the relation between the deliberative process and the final decision
remains one of the weak points of current public debates. Apart from institutional
instances of deliberation (as in parliamentary assemblies) where the exchanges are
organized with a view to actually making a decision, it is very rare that a political decision
is constrained by the results of the process. In the majority of cases, the only constraint on
the political sphere is a sort of moral obligation. This is the case in the procedures
organized in the framework of the National Commission on Public Debate (Commission
Nationale du D6bat public) in France. In Great Britain, the "Code of Consultation" obliges
administrations who wish to propose reforms to first submit these proposals to public
debate via a procedure which was itself the object of a debate two years ago. These debates
are available online in a space dedicated to public political debates called "Citizenspace."
Here again, the only obligation concerns the organization of the debate, the publication of
minutes, and an explicit motivation of the decision taken. The decision itself is not obliged
to follow the conclusions of the debate. In spite of these limitations, one should not
underestimate the weight of this moral obligation for elected politicians: it does impose at
least a duty to justify the decision which, in light of the freedom of appreciation of the
politician, does engage his responsibility. One can therefore understand that the
deliberative process is less contradictory with the notion of a representative democracy,
than with the notion of a Republic which, being the embodiment of the Nation, is the sole
depository of the capacity to deliberate.
51 Joas, La Cr6ativitM de l'agir, 269 (see n. 34).
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development of the new participative procedures as a reaction to the
crisis of integrated creativity that we have mentioned previously.
More than a response to the crisis of legitimacy in modem society,
deliberation offers a way out for a re-appropriation of the world and
the realisation of human values, which the contemporary development
of science and technology no longer allows. The conditions for setting
up the procedures of deliberation and the commitment of individuals
to the process therefore correspond to the double requirement of
ensuring the legitimacy of the decisional process with respect to the
democratic ideal while giving the citizen the possibility of "getting a
grasp" on his environment in order to reset his value preferences.52
According to its architecture, a given procedure will provide
certain constraints for the deployment of creative action, but also
many diversified opportunities (if allowed by the process) for self-
expression. In this sense, the deliberative procedure constitutes an
"environment" for participants who can draw from it the experience
necessary for knowledge, by their movements in a codified universe.
Deliberation organizes the collective integration of action by a varied
and appropriate communication between its members, so that
normative structures can emerge, structures that are necessary for the
subsequent elaboration of pre-reflexive elements of action. The
definition of the architecture or the "code" of the procedure is thus a
crucial element that determines the quality of a public debate. The
more the architecture is open and flexible, the easier it will be to
integrate new actors, each of whom brings his own perceptual relation
and cognitive framework to the environment. It is indeed on the basis
of this observation that Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe conceive their
"hybrid forum" which is composed of participants whose sensitivities
and personal trajectories are very heterogeneous and which accepts
"world views" which may be antagonistic. 53 Such world-views
correspond to very different apprehensions of reality, based on
differences in personal experience which translate into
incompatibilities in value preferences. In this case, the formal
structure of the argumentation is less important than an authentic
expression of its content.
52 F. Chateauraynaud, "Invention argumentative et d~bat public regard sociologique sur
'origine des bons arguments," Cahiers d'Aconomie politique, 47 (2004),
http://prospero.dyndns.org:9673/prospero/acces-public/o6-association-doxa/invention
sargumentatives.
53 Callon, et al., Agir dans un monde incertain (see n. 8).
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This conception of deliberation operates as a transition between
two sociological paradigms: from systemics to complexity. The
Habermasian version of deliberation is actually a hybrid concept
which combines systemic demands (from the political system for
example) with the complex formulation of value judgements in a
democratic political context. Our theoretical proposal situates itself in
the paradigms of complexity in which deliberation serves both as a
normative ideal for democratic legitimacy and as a reflexive instance
for the sharing of world-view and experience in a risk society.54 The
consequences of this shift are important. They impact the objectives
and the framing of deliberative procedures, and they also explain the
focus on inclusion in the process: in a complex society, viewpoints
linked to the specific situations of participants in their environment
should be as diverse as possible if one wants the deliberation to be
rich. Moreover, it is no longer possible to postulate a simple, direct
link between argumentation and truth, since "truth" is now situated,
in the cognitive sense of the term. Therefore, communication devices
and procedural methods constitute the first reflexive step for
deliberative processes in order to cover all the dimensions and
viewpoints that should be taken into account in a given debate. These
are closing remarks and should of course be pursued and developed
further in another paper.
V. CONCLUSION
In the course of this rough sketch of a concept of deliberation that
is not procedurally normative (i.e. is not presented as an "ideal"
procedure). I have sought a way out of the aporia that results from the
discursive foundations of Habermas's "communicative action." The
aporia lies in the fact that taken to its logical conclusion, the concept
of communicative action ends up excluding ordinary citizens from the
process of deliberation at the very same time that the democratic
legitimacy of the procedure depends on their presence.
In its new interpretation, a form of deliberation enlarged to
include all forms of action becomes meaningful in a democratic
context, where the constraints on individual action are established in a
manner that is transparent and itself democratic. Such a context is a
normative ideal; however, in practice, it inevitably suffers from
substantial limitations. Constant vigilance on the part of citizens is
necessary in order to be aware of the constraints on action; this
54 Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (see n. 5).
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vigilance can be practiced, in particular, by participation in
deliberative procedures.
The heuristic interest of this approach is that it makes it possible
to identify new ways in which value preferences can emerge and find
expression. For example, this concept of deliberation provides a
framework for analysing the emerging communication formats which
occur via new media of communication, and for identifying the
creative dimension of these new forms of justification.
The political practices which are constituted using these new
media, involving the elaboration of particular forms of expression, can
thus find their place in a concept of deliberation which seeks to profit
from the modes of appropriation of new media by diverse sections of
the population in order to enlarge the framework of exchanges with a
view to construct common world-views. In this sense, deliberation
does indeed constitute a process whereby the political dimension is
"invented." In other words, if political practices (taken in a wide sense
so as to include the manipulation of devices, the "tinkering" of
technologies, and the confrontation with a wide variety of modalities)
are indeed constitutive of our political culture, then it becomes clear
that a purely linguistic analysis amounts to a very severe restriction of
the political process. It is reduced to a very specific sort of political
culture: the institutional arrangements and procedures of the
republican elite. It follows that by raising the theory of
communicative action to the status of a theory of society as a whole,
Habermas contributes (even if this is not his intention) to the
conservatism of the dominant political culture, since he deprives this
culture of the means of evolving. In his formulation, communicative
action restricts the emergence of values to the traditional public
arenas derived from the salons of the Eighteenth Century bourgeoisie.
This concept is thus a fair target for the many criticisms it has
received, all of which emphasize that whatever its intentions, in
practice the procedural theory of communicative action is highly
conservative. There is a reason for this: the linguistic forms which
were elaborated for the construction of values arose in a very precise
context, those of the procedures and techniques of a patriarchal,
republican, conservative society.
In this text, I have only sketched out some of the premises for a
veritable conceptualisation of an alternative. There are many points
which require much deeper analysis. One of them is the
institutionalisation of "opened" deliberative practices which should be
analysed locally and further experimented. For instance, in France,
the National Commission of Public Debate is engaged in reform to
revisit mediations between citizens and political/industrial actors
involved in debatable programs or projects. The Commission
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envisions opening their debate to multimodal channels of expression
including online and more artistic channels. The extent to which
individuals mobilize technological devices in deliberative processes
when they are allowed to and what type of argumentation they
develop through them should be further observed and analysed. Are
there specific strategies linked to the format of expression in order to
be heard? Can we observe a specialization from certain type of
population according to the communication medium they use? These
questions rest at the core of a current research project which I hope to
present soon.
Other theoretical questions also remain, three of which are
particularly salient. First, the link between individual creativity and
the public expression of norms has to be specified, since our approach
renders the public sphere wide open to private considerations.
Second, the measure of the efficiency of the deliberation: this is
strongly linked with our theoretical model and has to be further
developed. Third, what are the limits of such procedures and how
does deliberation apply to the whole range of social and political
topics in a complex society? Such questions open up a wide research
program in the deliberative field.
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